Centrii CEO: renewables are cyber's 'soft edge' as state attacks rise

Centrii's Rafael Narezzi outlines six cybersecurity trends for energy operators, from fleet-wide visibility gaps to tightening compliance deadlines.

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Cybersecurity threats to energy infrastructure are intensifying, and the renewables sector is bearing the brunt, according to Rafael Narezzi, chief executive of Centrii, a cybersecurity specialist serving operators, asset owners and investors in the energy and renewables market. Narezzi has set out six trends he expects to define the sector's security posture through 2027 and beyond, covering state-sponsored attacks, shrinking patch windows and the creeping contractualisation of incident response.

The analysis arrives as attribution of state-linked attacks on European energy grids becomes more explicit. In 2026, UK and EU authorities attributed an attack on Poland's electricity network to Russia's FSB Centre 16. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), alongside 18 international partners, has warned that the same unit is actively targeting critical infrastructure globally, and the NCSC expects China and Russia to deploy AI routinely in cyber operations by 2028.

The renewables exposure

Narezzi describes the renewables estate as a "soft edge" for attackers: a fragmented landscape of thousands of wind, solar and battery energy storage system (BESS) sites, supplied by dozens of vendors, with no single owner responsible for the whole. Centrii's own GRIDLOCK risk analysis report assigns a 92% probability of a major coordinated attack on BESS infrastructure by 2031. That risk is compounded, the company argues, by rapid market growth: global storage installations rose more than 50% year on year, with 76% of capacity sourced from Chinese integrators, according to Wood Mackenzie research published in 2026. A single supply-chain vulnerability therefore propagates across a large share of installed capacity worldwide.

The exploitation window is closing in parallel. Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 report recorded that the average time between vulnerability disclosure and active exploitation fell from 63 days in 2018 to negative seven days in 2026, meaning attackers are now weaponising flaws before a patch is available. Verizon's 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report found that vulnerability exploitation accounted for 31% of breaches, up from 20% the previous year, while remediation timescales lengthened.

Regulation and contractual pressure

Narezzi argues that compliance will shift from administrative exercise to operational prerequisite. In North America, NERC CIP-015-1 network-monitoring requirements are phasing in from 2028 for control centres and 2030 for medium-impact sites, with 874 renewable and storage facilities already drawn into scope under a 20 MVA registration threshold. Fines run to $1 million per day for non-compliance.

In Europe, NIS2 is already in force across EU member states, and the EU Cybersecurity Act revision would give regulators the power to phase out high-risk component suppliers; solar inverters have already been flagged in that context. The UK Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is expected to take effect in 2027-28, introducing a 24-hour incident-reporting obligation and a subsequent consultation on breach liability.

Narezzi also points to a shift in how lenders and insurers are framing risk. Rather than asking whether an operator is secure in the abstract, counterparties are starting to require measurable recovery-time commitments, with the answer feeding into debt service coverage ratio calculations. Howden, the global insurance group, has separately advised energy operators to review whether their policies cap operational technology disruption cover, with many policies limiting claims to 180 days.

Editorial context

The energy cybersecurity market is already well-served by established OT security vendors including Claroty, Dragos and Nozomi Networks, all of which have expanded from industrial control system monitoring into renewable asset coverage. Centrii's positioning as a renewables-first specialist, rather than a broader ICS/SCADA vendor, reflects the sector's view that distributed renewable fleets present a distinct threat model from conventional power generation. Whether that differentiation translates into durable competitive advantage will depend in part on how rapidly the larger OT vendors extend fleet-level visibility capabilities.

The NCSC's 2026 annual review and the third-party data cited by Narezzi are publicly available; editors may wish to link to them directly. The 92% BESS attack probability figure originates from Centrii's own GRIDLOCK report and should be treated as a vendor-issued projection rather than an independent benchmark.